WW2 Tanks: Sherman v. Panther v. Tiger

[mbear]

In a thread in General Discussion, Black_Knyght asked:

The year is 3075...

You're an armchair history buff who's familiar with the legendary historic reputation of the ancient Germanic Panther and Tiger tanks.

What modern tank, in the age of 3075, do you think might might rank as a roughly modern equivalent to those great armored monsters of yesteryears gone by?

This quickly mutated into a discussion of why the Sherman/Panther/Tiger sucked or rocked. There was a lot of great info there, but it was totally off-topic. I asked if maybe we could move that info to a new thread in off-topic, and realized I could help by starting that thread.

So why did the Sherman/Panther/Tiger suck/rock?

[monbvol]

Well here is a pretty good video on at least the allied side of things and it covers a lot of the overblown myths of Shermans, American doctrine, and even talks about why some of them came about.

[Kit deSummersville]

Well, there is a tactical vs. strategic discussion to consider. As a general you don't worry about forces deploying a Tiger being able to reliably perform in the field as much as that tank crew that just spotted a Tiger on the other side of the hill.

[Matti]

Well here is a pretty good video on at least the allied side of things and it covers a lot of the overblown myths of Shermans, American doctrine, and even talks about why some of them came about.

Seen it year ago. To sum it (and other videos) up:
Early Shermans were death traps, later ones had more hatches with springs right above the heads and ammo didn't blow up (as often) anymore.
One German general had wrote report or letter, where he expresses his disappointment about unreliability of either Panther or Tiger (my memory fails here), and he'd rather have more Panzer IV instead. About half of the lost Tigers had broken down outside the combat and destroyed by their own crews.
USA encountered Tigers only 3 times between Normandy and Berlin. Most of the reported Tiger sightings were incorrect identifications.

[Sabelkatten]

In my uninformed opinion:

Tiger I: Bad idea, bad execution

Sherman: Bad idea, good execution

Tiger II: Good idea, bad execution

Both Tigers suffered from being to complex and expensive. The I also lacked armor sloping - as I understand it, it was an overgrown PzIV, yesterday's tank force-grown to make it more dangerous. The II corrected those faults but made it even more of an engineering nightmare...

The Sherman had decent speed and sloped armor, but it was still at heart an old infantry tank (it got better, thought ;) ). It was however well designed and built.

[MoneyLovinOgre4Hire]

One of the biggest flaws with German tanks, even discounting the fact that they were built using slave labor, was that they were hand-assembled.  That meant that they were much more labor intensive to repair than the assembly-line produced American tanks.  If you had an M4A1, you could be really confident that a replacement part was going to fit in and work right away.  You could cannibalize another M4A1 and use its parts in your tank with little difficulty.

Not so for the Germans: when your Tiger I broke, fixing it was an ordeal.  And because the Germans engineered their equipment for greater precision than the Americans did, they broke down a lot more.

[monbvol]

The Tiger I's armor was pretty poorly sloped.  So much so even the short 75mm with it's AP rounds could penetrate it from ranges most people wouldn't think possible if the Tiger I was square on to the Sherman with said short 75mm.  But that is the rub as Tiger crews were pretty good at angling their tanks and could penetrate the Sherman's armor from much farther away as there is no denying the capability of the 88mm on the Tiger I.

Also an interesting quote on the Hearts of Iron loading screen I see pop up once in a while is an excerpt from a Soviet manual about the use of captured Tiger tanks.  Basically it boils down to go ahead and use it until it breaks down but make no effort to return it to service.

[Scotty]

USA encountered Tigers only 3 times between Normandy and Berlin. Most of the reported Tiger sightings were incorrect identifications.

Uh, no.  Tiger ace Michael Wittmann was present in France from June to August until his death.  There was an entire Tiger battalion in Normandy and they did not sortie in large groups.

Simply put, that little factoid is completely and utterly incorrect.

[Bren]

Uh, no.  Tiger ace Michael Wittmann was present in France from June to August until his death.  There was an entire Tiger battalion in Normandy and they did not sortie in large groups.

Simply put, that little factoid is completely and utterly incorrect.

I wonder if other countries were fighting Germany in the west along with the USA ...

[Istal_Devalis]

Before we get to deep into this, keep in mind this little tidbit. Throughout all the studies  done involving tank vs tank combat, the winner usually ended being the guy who saw the other one first. The obsession with numbers tends to be a bit off because of this.

Also, I'd bear in mind that if your ONLY metric on what makes a superior tank is 'how good it kills other tanks', you're going to have comparison problems.

That said, the Panther outweighed the Sherman by a good 15 tons. It SHOULD have wiped the floor with the Sherman. The fact that it wasnt clearly superior says a lot about the problems with the design.

The Sherman had decent speed and sloped armor, but it was still at heart an old infantry tank (it got better, thought ;) ).

The Sherman was NOT an infantry tank. Infantry tanks were slow, thick armored tanks designed to support an infantry advance. The British were the only ones who built proper Infantry Tanks. It was a proper Medium tank, comparable (if not superior) to the PzIII/IV or T34.

[Challenger]

The Sherman was NOT an infantry tank. Infantry tanks were slow, thick armored tanks designed to support an infantry advance.

While that was the British/French definition, the Sherman’s explicit job was infantry support. That it was used as a medium tank highlights the holes in US tank doctrine in ww2, that it was initialy good in the role is a testiment to how well designed it was.

I’d contend that doctrine was the thing that held the Sherman back. If you look at the Firefly and later Israeli modifications there is little reason why most of the Shermans at D Day shouldn’t have been fitted with big cat killer guns. Except there was a deliberate decision made not to do so.

Challenger

[Sabelkatten]

But - at least AFAIK - the original intent was for the Sherman to clear away strongpoints to allow the infantry to advance. Engaging AFVs was for the tank destroyers.

I.e. it was an infantry tank "at heart". If it had been intended to fight enemy AFVs from the start a longer gun and lower profile would have been much more important.

But as it turns out the speed made it a useful medium tank, and once the armor, ammo storage, and gun was upgraded it turned into a useful MBT.

[Porkins]

Well, there is a tactical vs. strategic discussion to consider. As a general you don't worry about forces deploying a Tiger being able to reliably perform in the field as much as that tank crew that just spotted a Tiger on the other side of the hill.

This is awesome.

[Kidd]

Well, there is a tactical vs. strategic discussion to consider. As a general you don't worry about forces deploying a Tiger being able to reliably perform in the field as much as that tank crew that just spotted a Tiger on the other side of the hill.

Indeed, truly awesome.

Other than raw facts about tank performance, battlefield performance data has to be understood in the greater strategic context.

Perhaps its true about as many Tigers were abandoned as were destroyed by enemy fire. Quite likely they were harder to maintain than other tanks. And its very true that the German Army overall was less mechanised than the US Army.

But these are strategic considerations. A lot of Tigers were abandoned because the Germans had lost the battle. That they survived that long however speaks something about them, doesn't it? E.g. Kursk - the average Tiger present had T-34 kill scores in the double digits. Russian tanks even rammed Tigers to knock them out. But they were still lost because the Ostheer lost that battle, and abandoned much of their equipment as support infrastructure (e.g. tank recovery units) collapsed.

Other factors include that most tanks destroyed in combat were lost to artillery, antitank guns and mines; and the training and combat experience of the crews AND their support units played a major part in their performance.

The T-34 for example is acknowledged as 1 of the best if not THE best tank of WW2 taking technical as well as production factors into account. But it also suffered the greatest losses as the Soviet tank corps was inexperienced - the entire inventory was basically destroyed twice over, once at the start of the German offensive and again repelling it. Only continuous production kept their numbers up.

So in any tank vs tank matchup, consider if the facts concern the tank performance itself, or also considers that particular army as a system. I suspect for example if the Allies had the Tiger and the Germans had the Sherman things might have turned out differently... not necessarily better for the Germans.

[MoneyLovinOgre4Hire]

The T-34 is another tank with a vastly inflated reputation.  Reports of it ramming Tigers weren't intentional attacks for the most part, they were simply due to the tank having such poor optics that drivers couldn't see the Tigers until they ran into them.  Also, the controls were so stiff that drivers sometimes resorted to striking them with hammers to change gears.  The interiors were cramped to the point that it was basically impossible to escape if things went bad (and they often did), and most of them lacked radios, just for starters.  It wasn't until the T-34-85 upgrade, which was practically a new tank, that it actually started performing well.

[Ruger]

and most of them lacked radios, just for starters. 

Erm...my understanding is that this was true of many/most tanks during WW2, at least in the first few years...it's was one of the reasons Blitzkrieg was so successful...the Germans had one in every tank...

Ruger

[MoneyLovinOgre4Hire]

The Soviets in particular stood out with a lack of radios in their tanks, from every source I've ever seen on the subject.

[monbvol]

While that was the British/French definition, the Sherman’s explicit job was infantry support. That it was used as a medium tank highlights the holes in US tank doctrine in ww2, that it was initialy good in the role is a testiment to how well designed it was.

I’d contend that doctrine was the thing that held the Sherman back. If you look at the Firefly and later Israeli modifications there is little reason why most of the Shermans at D Day shouldn’t have been fitted with big cat killer guns. Except there was a deliberate decision made not to do so.

Challenger

But - at least AFAIK - the original intent was for the Sherman to clear away strongpoints to allow the infantry to advance. Engaging AFVs was for the tank destroyers.

I.e. it was an infantry tank "at heart". If it had been intended to fight enemy AFVs from the start a longer gun and lower profile would have been much more important.

But as it turns out the speed made it a useful medium tank, and once the armor, ammo storage, and gun was upgraded it turned into a useful MBT.

That is a myth.  US doctrine says tanks fight other tanks.  It is in the video I linked to.  What really doomed the Sherman in US service is that the short 75 was good enough to take on the Panzer IIs, IIIs, and IVs that they faced in Africa but the Tiger, Panther, and some of the various TDs of the Germans proved problematic.

[Getz]

Uh, no.  Tiger ace Michael Wittmann was present in France from June to August until his death.  There was an entire Tiger battalion in Normandy and they did not sortie in large groups.

Simply put, that little factoid is completely and utterly incorrect.

I hate to argue with you Scotty, because I know you''ll argue back, but I'm afraid the original statement is completely correct.  Schwere SS-Panzerabteilung 101 did indeed fight in Normandy but it was opposed only by Commonwealth forces.  They never fought far enough west to encounter US Army forces.

There has been a lot of material published in the last fifteen years or so that goes a long way to rehabilitate the reputation of the M4 and reappraise the reputation of the Panther in particular but this isn't a zero sum game.  Whilst we might recognise that the Panther had weak crew ergonomics and failed to provide adequate visibility for the gunner and loader it doesn't suddenly lose all it's virtues - it still had excellent tactical mobility, impressive protection across it's frontal aspect and a real hot-sauce gun that could reliably poke holes in just about anything it encountered.  It was still a "Good Tank," even if it wasn't quite as awesome as it's reputation suggests.

The point of fact is that nobody built the "ideal" tank during WWII.  The Germans got the holy trinity of combat power - firepower, armour and mobility - pretty much spot on with the Panther but failed badly on the production and logistics.  By contrast, the Americans really mastered that side of things as well, but did so with a machine that only had mediocre combat power.  Meanwhile the Russians got massive numbers of good enough vehicles at the cost of horrible ergonomics, and used said massive numbers to counteract sometimes appalling reliability.

[Scotty]

I wonder if other countries were fighting Germany in the west along with the USA ...

Tigers engaged American forces at Sailly (743rd Tank Battalion), Aachen (2nd Armored Division), multiple times in the Ardennes (Wardin, Bastogne; 10th Armored Division), and near continuously until the final days of the war in Europe in the Rurh Pocket.

I hate to argue with you Scotty, because I know you''ll argue back, but I'm afraid the original statement is completely correct.  Schwere SS-Panzerabteilung 101 did indeed fight in Normandy but it was opposed only by Commonwealth forces.  They never fought far enough west to encounter US Army forces.

There were actually three Tiger Battalions in Normandy (this is something I did not know before doing research).  You're correct most of them primarily engaged British forces.  However, the assertion (not your assertion, but the one upthread) that "US forces only encountered Tigers on three occasions in Western Europe; all other incidents are false sightings" is not correct.

Indeed, truly awesome.

Other than raw facts about tank performance, battlefield performance data has to be understood in the greater strategic context.

Perhaps its true about as many Tigers were abandoned as were destroyed by enemy fire. Quite likely they were harder to maintain than other tanks. And its very true that the German Army overall was less mechanised than the US Army.

It's not really a "perhaps".  Nearly half of the Tigers that mobilized to respond to the Normandy invasions failed mechanically before they reached the lines.  The very first Tiger delivered to North Africa caught fire while they were trying to get it off the ship.  They were incredibly fine-tuned machines that routinely experienced conditions that were not conducive to fine-tuned machines (that is to say: not a road).

[MoneyLovinOgre4Hire]

That is a myth.  US doctrine says tanks fight other tanks.  It is in the video I linked to.  What really doomed the Sherman in US service is that the short 75 was good enough to take on the Panzer IIs, IIIs, and IVs that they faced in Africa but the Tiger, Panther, and some of the various TDs of the Germans proved problematic.

And even then, Germany simply couldn't produce the Tiger, Panther, or big TDs in significant enough numbers to really matter on a strategic level.  Throughout the war, Germany managed to produce about 25,000 armored vehicles.  Roughly half of those were STuGs.  By comparison, the total production of Tiger Is and IIs combined was under 2,000 tanks while the a mere 91 Elefant tank destroyers were built.

American crews liked the 75mm gun.  When the Sherman Jumbo began arriving with the 76mm gun factory-installed, it was common for it to be replaced in the field with the 75mm before deploying the tank.  If it truly had been an inadequate gun, they would not have done that.

[Garrand]

The issue of the Sherman's 75mm cannon was one of politics. There were US observers that reported on the Invasion of Poland & especially the Battle of France. They developed a doctrine explicitly to deal with massed armored attacks & the Tank Destroyer corps were born. The US had the 76mm M1A1 as early as 1942, and the gun could be fitted in the smaller turret that housed the 75mm cannon (loads of Sherman -E9s postwar show this). However the installation was rejected as it was felt the turret was not big enough to properly work the cannon, the 76mm threw an inferior HE shell, and more importantly in 1942-43 the 75mm was sufficient to penetrate the 50mm armor of the Pz III & IV operating at the time...

Of course nothing is static & the Germans were upgrading the armor on their tanks to 70 & 80mm respectively, but nonetheless dedicated anti-tank work was the job of tank destroyers so if a tank showed up the Sherman couldn't deal with, call for support...

But the idea that the Sherman was just an infantry tank is a bit of a misnomer IMHO. THe British called it a Universal Tank, & Shermans were used just as much supporting infantry in independent tank Bns, as well as being the primary tank equipping Armored Divisions, whose glory job came in exploiting gaps in the enemy lines. The Germans were surrounded in Falaise in part because of reliable, fast Shermans were able to exploit the breakthrough at St Lo & surround the Germans in a pocket.

Finally I want to stress ultimately how important the strategic utility of tanks are in dictating the tactical situation at the cutting edge of the battle. After all, a Tiger is a fearsome tank, certainly, but if you have insufficient concentration due to breakdowns & losses due to scuttling, then that is going to have a strong impact on the tactical options German commanders will have on-hand.

Damon.

[Getz]

And even then, Germany simply couldn't produce the Tiger, Panther, or big TDs in significant enough numbers to really matter on a strategic level.  Throughout the war, Germany managed to produce about 25,000 armored vehicles.  Roughly half of those were STuGs.  By comparison, the total production of Tiger Is and IIs combined was under 2,000 tanks while the a mere 91 Elefant tank destroyers were built.

American crews liked the 75mm gun.  When the Sherman Jumbo began arriving with the 76mm gun factory-installed, it was common for it to be replaced in the field with the 75mm before deploying the tank.  If it truly had been an inadequate gun, they would not have done that.

They liked it until the Ardennes campaign, whereafter they clamoured for upgunned Shermans.  Coincidentally, the Ardennes campaign was the first time the US Army really got rough handled by German Panzers...

On the subject of numbers, The Elefants are a red herring, all ninety-one were effectively private venture construction from Porsche on the assumption he'd get the heavy tank contract.  That the German system allowed that sort of thing to happen was symptomatic of everything wrong with their arms procurement model, but it doesn't really say anything about German industrial capacity and if the Ministry of Armaments had had it's way not even one of them would have been constructed.  That they decided to do something useful with the unwanted chassis was merely thrift - and the reputation of the Elefant has undergone some rehabilitation in recent years too.  When one looks at it's combat effectiveness on the Eastern Front it seems to have a been a very effective tank killer and not many were lost to enemy action.

The Tiger II was a prominent victim of effective Allied bombing.  It only went into serial production at the end of 1943 and production was severely disrupted by repeated bombing of the factory.  The 500 odd units they did manage to produce in the space of only a year were effectively pre-production prototypes.  On the other hand, more than 5000 Panthers were constructed in the space of just two years, which - considering the conditions German industry was operating under - was no mean feat.

[Kidd]

That is a myth.  US doctrine says tanks fight other tanks.

In practice, US tanks fought other tanks. More commonly, artillery and antitank guns fought tanks. Doctrinally the Sherman is an infantry support tank, while M8s and M10s were the antipanzer vehicle of choice.

American crews liked the 75mm gun.  When the Sherman Jumbo began arriving with the 76mm gun factory-installed, it was common for it to be replaced in the field with the 75mm before deploying the tank.  If it truly had been an inadequate gun, they would not have done that.

Again, the greater strategic picture has to be considered. By this time the Allied tanks were fighting emplacements and thinner-skinned AFVs like the Stug. The HE shell was considered by far more valuable than HVAP.

But the idea that the Sherman was just an infantry tank is a bit of a misnomer IMHO. THe British called it a Universal Tank, & Shermans were used just as much supporting infantry in independent tank Bns, as well as being the primary tank equipping Armored Divisions, whose glory job came in exploiting gaps in the enemy lines.

The Sherman 75mm, very much so. The Brits employed the Sherman Firefly on Tigers and suchlike, and would commonly have only 1 Firefly to a troop of Shermans - more if enemy armour was expected.

[Kidd]

It's not really a "perhaps".  Nearly half of the Tigers that mobilized to respond to the Normandy invasions failed mechanically before they reached the lines. 

With a little help from the Dam Busters who destroyed the railway tunnel that should have transported the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler to Normandy.

By "failed mechanically", do you mean more maintenance or repair time was required to get a Tiger ready for combat? If so then yes. Once in combat its performance was beyond doubt in most theatres. Many Tigers were not actually knocked out by enemy action but were abandoned intact by their crews after the general failure of the rest of the attack.

[Scotty]

With a little help from the Dam Busters who destroyed the railway tunnel that should have transported the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler to Normandy.

By "failed mechanically", do you mean more maintenance or repair time was required to get a Tiger ready for combat? If so then yes. Once in combat its performance was beyond doubt in most theatres. Many Tigers were not actually knocked out by enemy action but were abandoned intact by their crews after the general failure of the rest of the attack.

No, I mean literally broke down on the road, typically in the transmission.  The transportation of Tigers to Normandy is one I already mentioned, but nearly a dozen of them flat out broke down on the trip there and had to be left behind to catch up days later.  That was not an isolated event.

[monbvol]

In practice, US tanks fought other tanks. More commonly, artillery and antitank guns fought tanks. Doctrinally the Sherman is an infantry support tank, while M8s and M10s were the antipanzer vehicle of choice.

Not according to US doctrine.  Tank Destroyers and anti tank guns were considered purely defensive options.  That vehicles like the Hellcat, Wolverine, and Jackson were getting used offensively was because they were pretty much tanks and they were being used to bust bunkers for it too.

It is in the video I linked to.

[Cannonshop]

No, I mean literally broke down on the road, typically in the transmission.  The transportation of Tigers to Normandy is one I already mentioned, but nearly a dozen of them flat out broke down on the trip there and had to be left behind to catch up days later.  That was not an isolated event.

nope, he means they were unreliable, as in "Broke down prior to encountering enemy forces."

This also happened with the Panthers at Kursk, btw.

The biggest issues with German tanks from Tiger1 through Konigstiger and Panther, was always with the advanced automotive components-that is, engines, transmission, and suspension.

It's a bit like those expensive Italian supercars-when they're running, they're great, but they don't tend to stay running for very long.  German engineering in the modern era is reliable, but in WWII they were basically about a step up from WWII era Japanese or Italian design quality.

which is to say, "More likely to fail before the enemy is encountered, and more difficult to get working again after a breakdown."

Had, for example, the German forces NOT suffered the pre-and-out-of-battle breakdown rates they did, Kursk might've turned out somewhat differently.

[Scotty]

In general, the problem with (midwar) German tanks is that they were too intricate and hard to keep working, on top of being designed for vehicles 20 tons lighter than they actually were, not that they were (necessarily) poorly designed.  One probably begets the other, but in the narrowest view of things they weren't "bad" equipment.  That said, keeping a delicate instrument working in a combat zone, or even in the gaps between combat zones, is a monumental effort even when they're not hand-built.

Late war German tanks suffered from a host of material issues and in some cases outright sabotage, which only exacerbated the problem.

[guardiandashi]

to emphasize the issue the german units had in plain English:

each tank was a precision instrument designed to never fail, and with many parts adjusted and custom tweaked  to work in that specific unit. so when it did break the replacement parts also had to be tweaked to actually work with field available tools instead of the factory tools.

the American units on the other hand were assembled out of standardized parts from numerous supply factories that ALL made them to the same specs with similar tolerances, thus any part from any (standard) source will work, some might work better than others and some might be very tight or rather loose, but they will work, and when something broke, they were actually designed with repairs in mind, so it was reasonably easy/feasible to repair them.

[MoneyLovinOgre4Hire]

And then the Germans got so desperate for tanks (and all other war materials) that they ended up completely ending all quality control at their factories.

On the subject of numbers, The Elefants are a red herring, all ninety-one were effectively private venture construction from Porsche on the assumption he'd get the heavy tank contract.  That the German system allowed that sort of thing to happen was symptomatic of everything wrong with their arms procurement model, but it doesn't really say anything about German industrial capacity and if the Ministry of Armaments had had it's way not even one of them would have been constructed.  That they decided to do something useful with the unwanted chassis was merely thrift - and the reputation of the Elefant has undergone some rehabilitation in recent years too.  When one looks at it's combat effectiveness on the Eastern Front it seems to have a been a very effective tank killer and not many were lost to enemy action.

Actually, what happened was that the Soviets were using SU-152s.  Their HE shells would usually kill the Elefant's crew in one hit but leave the vehicle intact, allowing it to be recovered and put back into service (though I can't imagine that it was at all pleasant for the replacement crews).  And the Elefant wasn't the only oversized vehicle that the Germans produced, since, you know, there was kind of an obsession with such things in the upper echelons.  I mean, they thought that the Maus was a good idea.

[Bren]

I think this is what the gentleman in the video was referencing re: Tiger encounters

Steven Zaloga:
When you read unit accounts, whether it’s the actual unit after action reports or the published books, everyone talks about Tiger tanks. But in looking at it in both German records and US records, I’ve only found three instances in all the fighting from Normandy to 1945 where the US encountered Tigers. And by Tigers I mean Tiger 1 ...  I’m not talking King Tigers, the strange thing is that the US Army encountered King Tigers far more often than Tigers. That’s partly because there weren’t a lot of Tigers left by 1944, production ends in August 1944. There were not a lot of Tigers in Normandy, they were mostly in the British sector, the British saw a lot of Tigers. Part of the issue is that US tankers were notorious for identifying everything as a Tiger tank, everything from Stug III assault guns to Panzer IV and Panthers and Tigers.

There was one incident in August of 1944 where 3rd Armored division ran into three Tigers that were damaged and being pulled back on a train, they shot them up with an anti-aircraft half-track. And then there was a single Tiger company up in the Bulge that was involved in some fighting. And then there was one short set of instances in April 1945, right around the period of the film, where there was a small isolated Tiger unit that actually got engaged with one of the new US M26 Pershing tank units. They knocked out a Pershing and then in turn that Tiger was knocked out and the Pershing tanks knocked out another King Tiger over the following days. So I found three verifiable instances of Tigers encountering, or having skirmishes with US troops in 1944-45. So it was very uncommon. It definitely could have happened, there are certainly lots of gaps in the historical record both on the German side and the US side. I think the idea that the US encountered a lot of Tigers during WW2 is simply due to the tendency of the US troops to call all German tanks Tigers. It’s the same thing on the artillery side. Every time US troops are fired upon, it’s an 88, whether it’s a 75mm Pak 40 anti-tank gun, a real 88, a 105mm field howitzer, they were all called 88’s.

[Kidd]

Not according to US doctrine.  Tank Destroyers and anti tank guns were considered purely defensive options.  That vehicles like the Hellcat, Wolverine, and Jackson were getting used offensively was because they were pretty much tanks and they were being used to bust bunkers for it too.

Okay... but I was talking about the Sherman.

Had, for example, the German forces NOT suffered the pre-and-out-of-battle breakdown rates they did, Kursk might've turned out somewhat differently.

Unlikely, given the other factors and forces arrayed against them - I believe the German attack touched only 3 out of 8 Soviet defensive belts. But that's beside the point...

Some if not many of the breakdowns were attributed to the Russian winter; the German AFVs (not just Tigers) would not only bog down in mud, the mud would subsequently freeze. The Tigers did have the worst of it due to their interleaved wheel system. This issue isn't exactly a mechanical fault per se; the Tiger just wasn't designed for the Russian climate.

Breaking down outside of battle is a strategic mobility issue. Breaking down during battle is a tactical issue. When comparing the flaws of say T-34 and Tiger, we should keep this in mind.

And then the Germans got so desperate for tanks (and all other war materials) that they ended up completely ending all quality control at their factories.

Indeed. So again - were the Tiger, King Tiger et al bad because of design flaws? Or because the system supporting them was steadily breaking down? How would the Tiger have fared in the hands of say the US Army?

P.s. It also pays to consider the source of the facts and claims. Some of these documentaries and historians are a little suspect.... I've seen 1 which downchecks the MG34/42 for its high rate of fire claiming it overburdened German infantry squads with carrying "too much" ammo...  ::)

[MoneyLovinOgre4Hire]

To be honest, in an alternate history where the US tried building the Tiger first, I think that they would have ended up with a radically different end design that was lighter and had a much more robust suspension system, among other changes.  But the US Army never really seemed to like the idea of using a heavy tank too much before the entire concept of the heavy tank was abandoned in favor of the Main Battle Tank.

[Getz]

And the Elefant wasn't the only oversized vehicle that the Germans produced, since, you know, there was kind of an obsession with such things in the upper echelons.  I mean, they thought that the Maus was a good idea.

That's not quite the whole picture.  Dr Porsche and Hitler thought the Maus was a good idea.  On the other hand, the German Armaments Ministry thought it was a terrible idea and moved heaven and earth to (successfully) kill the project.

From the end of 1943 onwards, the Armaments ministry wanted to manufacture only two tanks - Panthers and Tiger IIs - with Pz IV production tolerated because they could not afford to stop production at the Nibelungenwerk factory to retool the line.  Interestingly, this mirrors almost exactly the Hi-Lo mix both the British and American armies adopted in the early cold war when facing the same threat of massed Soviet armour - a 45 ton "universal" tank (Panther/Centurion/M46) and a 70 ton heavy gun tank to support it (Tiger II/Conqueror/M103)

To be honest, in an alternate history where the US tried building the Tiger first, I think that they would have ended up with a radically different end design that was lighter and had a much more robust suspension system, among other changes.  But the US Army never really seemed to like the idea of using a heavy tank too much before the entire concept of the heavy tank was abandoned in favor of the Main Battle Tank.

Check out the US M6 heavy tank - that's what the US Ordnance Department was thinking of when it comes to heavy tanks circa 1940 so it's more or less contemporary with the Tiger (in fact, the Tiger is the earlier design).

It does not compare well with the Tiger...

[monbvol]

Okay... but I was talking about the Sherman.

And by doctrine the Sherman was the antipanzer unit of choice offensively.  It actually did it fairly well.  Just the US got a bit overconfident and didn't want to build up the logistical base to support the 76mm HV gun which didn't have as good an HE round for bunker busting on top of the 75mm that did have a good HE round and was perfectly capable of taking out everything the US encountered so far.

[worktroll]

US and British tanks missed on the evolutionary developments that the Germans and Russians got on the ostfront. Similarly, US and British tankers lacked - for the most part - actual combat experiencel. Max Hasting's book on Overlord makes it clear how little experience most Allied soldiers had in 1944, and how commanders hoarded their combat vets like gold - and then wore them down by using them to deal with hard problems.

It's a personal opinion, but I see the mirror of that in the Ardennes offensive - the Germans lacking experienced troops, and having to ask too much from a small combat core. The Americans by that time had learned enough to blunt the once-feared Wermacht attack.

[VhenRa]

Another factor there is, most of the Commonwealth (And US, but I am not sure with them) veterans of North Africa... had been sent to Italy IIRC.

[Garrand]

Interestingly, this mirrors almost exactly the Hi-Lo mix both the British and American armies adopted in the early cold war when facing the same threat of massed Soviet armour - a 45 ton "universal" tank (Panther/Centurion/M46) and a 70 ton heavy gun tank to support it (Tiger II/Conqueror/M103)

Not sure I would go with that parallel. Only around 100 Conquerers were built in two marks, and around 100 M103s used by the US Army (the rest, something like over 200 went to the marines who were screaming for a heavy tank apparently...). Even then those tanks only served for a short period. THe M103 was either out of service or going out of service by the time M60s were being issued. The M60s gun could fire sabot rounds & actually hit things reliably with it, whereas the 120mm on the M103 & Conquerer (same gun, in fact) were still limited to APCBC or HEAT rounds (AFAIK never got an APCR round).

As an aside, the accuracy of the 17pder firing APDS was pretty dreadful (somewhere around 50% hits at 1000yds, compared to nearly 100% with the old 75mm). THis was because the rifiling favored ol fashioned AP rounds rather than APDS. When the US Army tested the weapon in IIRC '42, they rejected it in favor of the 76mm M1 due to these accuracy issues, and the 90mm was already well under way & had near similar penetration performance firing APCR rounds with MUCH better accuracy...

Check out the US M6 heavy tank - that's what the US Ordnance Department was thinking of when it comes to heavy tanks circa 1940 so it's more or less contemporary with the Tiger (in fact, the Tiger is the earlier design).

It does not compare well with the Tiger...

It was a terrible design, extremely conservative & again only around 100 or so were built & put into service (none saw service overseas).  Keep in mind that the Army had already grappled with the issues of heavy tanks & rejected them for much of the war: a heavy tank was more expensive to manufacture, created a greater logistical strain in fielding them, as well as taking up more cargo capacity & space getting them to Europe. It really wasn't until the T26E3 that the Army reversed its stance, nearly too late for service in Europe (the war would go on only for a few months more by the time they entered combat), and even then post war -- and especially with the powerplant mods that created the M46 -- it was redesignated & used as a medium tank. So whatever lessons the Army learned from heavy tanks in WWII they were never really enthusiastic enough on it...

Damon.

[Istal_Devalis]

It was brought up before, but as it's one of those myths (Like the Ronson thing) that refuses to die...

US Army Doctrine was that tanks were offensive units. They would engage targets across the board, which included other tanks. The entire point of the 75mm gun was that it could take out the German armor of the time. If they saw enemy tanks, they were EXPECTED to try to kill it. They were never designed to be infantry support. This myth got started due to a misunderstanding about the nature of the tank destroyer units.

Tank Destroyer formations were DEFENSIVE units meant to counteract attacking armor. They weren't designed to replace tanks in the tank killing role, they were there to free up the tanks for offensive operations.

Now, we did have armored vehicles designed purely for infantry support. These used mortars and howitzers. This did include a Sherman mounting a 105mm Howitzer.

As a note, another thing that tends to get glossed over with the Sherman was how easy it was to repair and modify. Beyond the fact they were mass produced with standardization in mind, all the major components could be swapped out with a minimum of equipment in comparison with other tanks of the time.

[Matti]

How would the Tiger have fared in the hands of say the US Army?

I guess it would have been about the same as with Pershing: replaced by Shermans after breaking down

[The Eagle]

I don't recall the source, but I remember learning that one of the primary reasons the M6 didn't enter service -- and why there was such push-back against heavy tanks in the US to begin with -- was actually because the standard cargo cranes used in US ports couldn't lift them.  There was a hard cap on tank weight because it would have been too difficult to actually ship any heavy tanks overseas because of this.

[MoneyLovinOgre4Hire]

I've always heard that the M6's weight was a problem, though I've also heard that there were other factors that contributed, like its crew compartment being awkward, its height, and it being hard to maintain.

IIRC, the only use it actually got was in stunt shows for the promotion of war bond sales.

[lrose]

Actually Tank Destroyers were originally intended as offensive weapons per Field Manual FM 18-5 Tank Destroyer Field Manual June 1942

* 9. ROLE.-a. Tank destroyer units are especially designed for offensive action against hostile armored forces. They are capable of semi-independent action but preferably operate in close cooperation with friendly units of all arms. They are allocated to large units as indicated in paragraph 36.
b. When supported units are engaged in offensive action, tank destroyers protect them against armored counterattack
and thus allow full exploitation of their success.
c. When a supported unit is engaged in defensive action, a minimum of antitank weapons are located to cover obstacles and establish a first echelon of defense disposed in depth against tanks while a maximum of mobile antitank weapons are held in reserve, prepared for immediate offensive action. Organic antitank weapons of front line units are used for this first line of defense; tank destroyer units form the mobile
reserve.

and

* 37. EMPLOYMENT.-Tank destroyer units are employed of­fensively in large numbers, by rapid maneuver, and by surprise.
* 38. OFFENSIVE ACTION.-Offensive action allows the entire strength of a tank destroyer unit to be engaged against the enemy. For individual tank destroyers, offensive action con­sists of vigorous reconnaissance to locate hostile tanks and movement to advantageous positions from which to attack the enemy by fire. Tank destroyers avoid "slugging matches" with tanks, but compensate for their light armor and diffi­culty of concealment by exploitation of their mobility and superior observation.

So initially the Tank Destroyers (which were equipped with self-propelled guns) were intended to be used in an offensive role, or to launch a counter attack against an enemy offensive.  It was later in the war (as the US forces gained combat experience) that the role of the Tank Destroyer began to change.  In  1943 a number of TD units were converted to towed guns and the role of the tank destroyers was change from an aggressive one of seeking out enemy tanks to a defensive one of protecting other troops from enemy tanks.

[monbvol]

I do wish the US Army did change the numbering because the 44 manual has the exact same number(18-5) and does make the TD much more of a defensive unit.

[Matti]

Actually Tank Destroyers were originally intended as offensive weapons per Field Manual FM 18-5 Tank Destroyer Field Manual June 1942

Well, someone in here has actually bothered to read the damn thing. I have done some reading myself and watched YouTube videos on the subject (by "Chieftain" Nicholas Moran). TDs were meant to attack in large groups, as quoted by lrose. However, many officers did it wrong and send them in small groups. Maybe someone got frustrated with it and decided to replace losses with towed guns in order to reduce their abuse in offensive operations. Also towed guns were 17 pounders (or whatever USA calls them).

And 1 more reason why USA didn't accept 17 pounder for Sherman: it's too damn big! Crew can't operate effectively with it, which means reduced rate of fire compared to smaller guns. Brits just decided to suck it up and roll with Firefly anyway. Also number of Shermans with 76 millimeter gun were field modified with 75 millimeter gun, because crew is more familiar with it.

[Kidd]

Well, someone in here has actually bothered to read the damn thing. I have done some reading myself and watched YouTube videos on the subject (by "Chieftain" Nicholas Moran). TDs were meant to attack in large groups, as quoted by lrose. However, many officers did it wrong and send them in small groups. Maybe someone got frustrated with it and decided to replace losses with towed guns in order to reduce their abuse in offensive operations. Also towed guns were 17 pounders (or whatever USA calls them).

I read the '42 version, and a couple of post-WW2 analyses. Didn't know there was a '44 version.

1 big point against that doctrine is that it was almost never used the way it was intended, except for a single battle in the African campaign. And during that battle the TDs took more losses than were expected - something like one TD for every 2 panzers, IIRC, which though a favourable exchange ratio was not what was intended at all. And AT guns had performed better or just as well in that fight.

The massive German blitzkrieg that was expected was never engaged by the West as they had all been chewed up during Ops Bagration and Citadel. (I'd love to read a good tactical analysis of the latter by the way.) Artillery and AT guns were found to be better at killing panzers, so those were most often used, proving especially effective at battles like Mortain.

It seems to me that while the standard Sherman was indeed the jack-of-all-trades of WW2 tanks and a very effective one at that, possibly making it the grand-daddy of MBTs, in the end for mobile anti-tank work the Allies tended to use tank destroyers like the Sherman Firefly (Brits) and M10/18/36s (US). Making the other tanks and the standard Sherman de facto infantry support tanks.

[monbvol]

I read the '42 version, and a couple of post-WW2 analyses. Didn't know there was a '44 version.

1 big point against that doctrine is that it was almost never used the way it was intended, except for a single battle in the African campaign. And during that battle the TDs took more losses than were expected - something like one TD for every 2 panzers, IIRC, which though a favourable exchange ratio was not what was intended at all. And AT guns had performed better or just as well in that fight.

The massive German blitzkrieg that was expected was never engaged by the West as they had all been chewed up during Ops Bagration and Citadel. (I'd love to read a good tactical analysis of the latter by the way.) Artillery and AT guns were found to be better at killing panzers, so those were most often used, proving especially effective at battles like Mortain.

It seems to me that while the standard Sherman was indeed the jack-of-all-trades of WW2 tanks and a very effective one at that, possibly making it the grand-daddy of MBTs, in the end for mobile anti-tank work the Allies tended to use tank destroyers like the Sherman Firefly (Brits) and M10/18/36s (US). Making the other tanks and the standard Sherman de facto infantry support tanks.

Well the Chieftan in the video I linked does quote from a US tank manual that tanks do fight other tanks in US doctrine, but I'll have to see which FM he pulls the quote from.  I wouldn't be surprised if it was another revised manual with the same number contradicting earlier information.

[Garrand]

Maybe someone got frustrated with it and decided to replace losses with towed guns in order to reduce their abuse in offensive operations. Also towed guns were 17 pounders (or whatever USA calls them).

US did not use the 17pder in the ATG role (or at all except for a handful of Fireflys on loan from the Brits IIRC). The US developed its own 76mm ATG based on the M7 cannon from the M10 Tank Destroyer (or rather they had similar lineages).

Damon.

[Vehrec]

German tank reliability problems were a multi-level affair that can't be pinned to any one point-but if I were to point to the biggest problems, they would be Adolf, Interchangeable Parts, and Winning The War.  Hitler is a problem for tank reliability, because he likes making new tanks instead of making spare parts, and meddles to see to it that rather than repair existing tanks, they build new ones and put them into new tank divisions.  Rebuilding old units doesn't excite him like making new ones does, so we get spare parts arriving at depots where they are immediately seized by armed parties from armored divisions.  Your tank breaks down?  Good luck finding the part you need, thanks to Hitler.  Next is the nature of the parts themselves-like the British and the Soviets, German parts aren't really identical enough to swap between tanks or to install without some tweaks.  Not every part mind you, but enough of them have tolerances tighter in fitting than in manufacturing.  So you need a proper machine shop at your repair depot, instead of just a crane-type thing to lift up heavy equipment while you install it.  At the very least, you need a trained machinist who knows how to fit things together-and he would be better used in a factory than in your depot.  So the very parts themselves are more difficult to install.  The final point, Winning the War, is one of those things where the Nazis, being rushed, rushed weapons into production that simply weren't ready.  The old myth that the Me-262 could have won the war had it arrived a year earlier isn't just false-it's doubly false because like so many other Nazi wonderweapons, it simply couldn't have been rushed into service that much sooner.   Indeed, many of these weapons were delivered too soon, with too little testing done.  If the Panther had had it's introduction delayed until '44 or '45, they could have caught all the mechanical issues before they became serious problems.  But since the Nazis were losing the war, a wonder-weapon today that spends most of it's time in a garage is better than one that's spending all it's time on a testing range.  The A4 was hardly going to win a war by terror-bombing.  But dammit, they could try, and the fact that it used slave labor in the production process was, to the Nazis' a neat bonus, combining their racial-war ideals with their needs for weaponry.  Not Trying Hard Enough is not something you can accuse them of in '42 onward.

[MoneyLovinOgre4Hire]

German tank reliability problems were a multi-level affair that can't be pinned to any one point-but if I were to point to the biggest problems, they would be Adolf, Interchangeable Parts, and Winning The War.  Hitler is a problem for tank reliability, because he likes making new tanks instead of making spare parts, and meddles to see to it that rather than repair existing tanks, they build new ones and put them into new tank divisions.  Rebuilding old units doesn't excite him like making new ones does, so we get spare parts arriving at depots where they are immediately seized by armed parties from armored divisions.

He was also obsessed with building bigger tanks than everyone else.  Every new tank had to have thicker armor and a bigger gun, and that ended up resulting in tanks that were too heavy for their suspension systems, moved slowly, broke down under their own weight, and took a lot more resources to build and maintain.

[Getz]

He was also obsessed with building bigger tanks than everyone else.  Every new tank had to have thicker armor and a bigger gun, and that ended up resulting in tanks that were too heavy for their suspension systems, moved slowly, broke down under their own weight, and took a lot more resources to build and maintain.

This is not entirely correct.  Neither the Panther nor Tiger was too heavy for their suspension, and neither was slow moving for their weight class.  What they were was too heavy for their transmission systems.

Meanwhile, the late Pz IV models were overloaded, as they had piled upwards of 25 tons of guns and armour onto a suspension system only designed for 18 tons.

[Garrand]

This is not entirely correct.  Neither the Panther nor Tiger was too heavy for their suspension, and neither was slow moving for their weight class.  What they were was too heavy for their transmission systems.

To whit the Panther could do 28mph at a time when most medium tanks could only do 24 to 26mph...

Damon.

[Matti]

This is not entirely correct.  Neither the Panther nor Tiger was too heavy for their suspension, and neither was slow moving for their weight class.  What they were was too heavy for their transmission systems.

Meanwhile, the late Pz IV models were overloaded, as they had piled upwards of 25 tons of guns and armour onto a suspension system only designed for 18 tons.

At least one general wrote a report/letter where he says he'd rather have more Panzer IV than Panther/Tiger.

[VhenRa]

Honestly, I would rather have the true gem of the German AFV production.

StuG IIIs. At least they worked!

[HobbesHurlbut]

Honestly, I would rather have the true gem of the German AFV production.

StuG IIIs. At least they worked!

You mean the one that was built on a Panzer III chasis?  8)

[Garrand]

I've always been partial to the StuG IV, even if it was a waste of resources. Better looking AFV IMHO...

Damon.

[marauder648]

In reality the Panzer IV with the long 75 was perfectly good for dealing with ANY allied Tank until something like the Comet or IS-1 came along.  Building more of them and working on that chassis would have been more workable than the Zoo.

The Panther, Tiger and Tiger II were magnificent machines, and the Panther along with the T-34 helped set the development of modern AFVs, but what the Germans needed was easier, quicker to produce and cheaper machines, and they had that with the Panzer IV. 

[HobbesHurlbut]

In reality the Panzer IV with the long 75 was perfectly good for dealing with ANY allied Tank until something like the Comet or IS-1 came along.  Building more of them and working on that chassis would have been more workable than the Zoo.

The Panther, Tiger and Tiger II were magnificent machines, and the Panther along with the T-34 helped set the development of modern AFVs, but what the Germans needed was easier, quicker to produce and cheaper machines, and they had that with the Panzer IV.

The problem was the limitations of the Panzer IV, long 75 gun was right up there. They could not put in a better model or a bigger gun like the 88. Panther had a longer 75 that the IV could not realistically support as a turret gun.

[marauder648]

Oh indeed, but the long 75 they had on the Panzer IV was still perfectly good as an AT weapon until the end of the war, again unless you ran into a IS-1 or a Comet.  But it's performance wasn't at Panther 75 levels, meaning it had to get closer to engage, and that meant that it was at risk too. 

Its a case of swings and roundabouts.  The Germans couldn't really do the WAllies/Soviet approach of 'good enough' and then churn it out by the gigaton.  With a smaller manpower base, the Germans couldn't afford to trade losses.  So making a superior tank, that can engage before the other side can and get them home again makes sense.  At which point it then becomes more expensive/harder/slower to produce at which point you're going to be massively outnumbered and even your more advanced tank can be drowned in numbers. 

So what do you do. Build a 'good enough' like the Panzer IV and accept heavier casualties, or build a lesser number of superior tanks and be outnumbered.

[Kidd]

Oh indeed, but the long 75 they had on the Panzer IV was still perfectly good as an AT weapon until the end of the war, again unless you ran into a IS-1 or a Comet.  But it's performance wasn't at Panther 75 levels, meaning it had to get closer to engage, and that meant that it was at risk too. 

Its a case of swings and roundabouts.  The Germans couldn't really do the WAllies/Soviet approach of 'good enough' and then churn it out by the gigaton.  With a smaller manpower base, the Germans couldn't afford to trade losses.  So making a superior tank, that can engage before the other side can and get them home again makes sense.  At which point it then becomes more expensive/harder/slower to produce at which point you're going to be massively outnumbered and even your more advanced tank can be drowned in numbers. 

So what do you do. Build a 'good enough' like the Panzer IV and accept heavier casualties, or build a lesser number of superior tanks and be outnumbered.

Exactly.

[Getz]

Problem was, by 1945 the Pz IV's time was up.  It was still adequate against M4s and T34s and Cromwells - but with M26s, T44s and Centurions starting to reach the battlefield it's 75/L48 was no longer a viable gun.

[Garrand]

So what do you do. Build a 'good enough' like the Panzer IV and accept heavier casualties, or build a lesser number of superior tanks and be outnumbered.

As an aside to this discussion, one thing the Germans did was put their vets in Pz IVs & their greenhorns in Panthers. The idea was that the superior tank would compensate for the skill of the crew, giving more "equal" results. But then you also get results like the Battle of Arracourt, where one Combat Command of the US 4th Armored Div beat 2 Panzerbrigades (equipped with Panthers & green crews) as well as elements from actual Panzerdivisions.

Damon.

[monbvol]

Another factor that helped drive Germany towards fewer better tanks was they just had too limited fuel and rubber production to build and support larger numbers of tanks.

[Matti]

So what do you do. Build a 'good enough' like the Panzer IV and accept heavier casualties, or build a lesser number of superior tanks and be outnumbered.

How about a tank that is reliable and easy to maintain & repair? Sherman is that, Panther & Tigers are not, and T-34 may fall little short on reliability.

[Kidd]

How about a tank that is reliable and easy to maintain & repair? Sherman is that, Panther & Tigers are not, and T-34 may fall little short on reliability.

How good was the Sherman's armour, though?

[Matti]

How good was the Sherman's armour, though?

I looked it up on Wikipedia:

Later Shermans had an upgraded glacis plate that was uniformly 63.5 mm (2.50 in) thick and sloped at 47 degrees from the vertical, providing an effective thickness of 93.1 mm (3.67 in) over the entire plate.

[Garrand]

In addition, some Shermans were issued with armor upgrade kits late in the war that added thickness to the glacis plate/transmision cover, & sides of the turret (not referring to the Jumbo here), so some late-model Shermans could be pushing over 100mm effective LOS armor thickness by the final months of the war.

Damon.

[Kidd]

In addition, some Shermans were issued with armor upgrade kits late in the war that added thickness to the glacis plate/transmision cover, & sides of the turret (not referring to the Jumbo here), so some late-model Shermans could be pushing over 100mm effective LOS armor thickness by the final months of the war.

I don't know, but that wiki quote claims to give the figures: "later Shermans had an upgraded glacis plate..."

which is not far off from the Panzer IV Ausf H, right? and less than Panther Ausf A onwards.

[Matti]

I don't know, but that wiki quote claims to give the figures: "later Shermans had an upgraded glacis plate..."

which is not far off from the Panzer IV Ausf H, right? and less than Panther Ausf A onwards.

Yes, but Panther wasn't made in tens of thousands. Oh, and one more thing about Sherman: hatches are right above the crew and getting out is faster & easier than in most (any?) other tanks of the time.

[MoneyLovinOgre4Hire]

I don't know, but that wiki quote claims to give the figures: "later Shermans had an upgraded glacis plate..."

which is not far off from the Panzer IV Ausf H, right? and less than Panther Ausf A onwards.

But the Panzer IV was a little square box with essentially no angling on the frontal armor, unlike the Sherman's well-angled front.

[Getz]

But the Panzer IV was a little square box with essentially no angling on the frontal armor, unlike the Sherman's well-angled front.

True, but the glacis plate of the Pz IV H and J was 80mm thick.  Thinner sloped armour is not necessarily superior to thicker vertical armour.

[MoneyLovinOgre4Hire]

True, but the glacis plate of the Pz IV H and J was 80mm thick.  Thinner sloped armour is not necessarily superior to thicker vertical armour.

The original M4's glacis plat was 50 mm thick and angled to give it effectively 90 mm of thickness.  There weren't a lot of anti-tank guns that would have penetrated the Sherman without penetrating the Panzer IV H at the same range.  And of course, by the time the Panzer IV H was out, the Sherman had already received armor upgrades.

[Garrand]

True, but the glacis plate of the Pz IV H and J was 80mm thick.  Thinner sloped armour is not necessarily superior to thicker vertical armour.

Not sure I would go with that. The LOS thickness of a Sherman's glacis plate was approx 90mm as posted above, which is still numerically better than 80mm. Plus sloped armor increases the chance of a ricochet or even other issues with fusing (the first HVAP round issued for the 76mm M1A1 cannon had issues with penetration due to the rounds shape ricocheting off the sloped armor of the Panther). The only time vertical armor would be at an advantage is vs high angle fire, such as long range shots that have to "arc" into the target & thus do not come in at LOS.

Edit: or side shots per the trick with the Tiger 1, though I would think any tank could take advantage of that...

Damon.

[Scotty]

True, but the glacis plate of the Pz IV H and J was 80mm thick.  Thinner sloped armour is not necessarily superior to thicker vertical armour.

While you are technically correct that "Thinner sloped armour is not necessarily superior to thicker vertical armour", determining whether it was in this case is a math problem not an opinion.

80 mm of armor at 90 degrees is just 80 mm of armor.  50 mm of armor at 45 degrees is closer to 90 mm.

This diagram provides an excellent explanation:

[Challenger]

How about a tank that is reliable and easy to maintain & repair? Sherman is that, Panther & Tigers are not, and T-34 may fall little short on reliability.

Ease of repair and maintenance are important, but not at the expence of being combat effective. The Germans were horribly outnumbered by 1943. They needed a qualitive advantage at the point of contact over tanks like the T-34 and KV-1. Even if they could have produce enough Panzer IVs to compete on the quantative front, where would they have got the crews and fuel?

Realy the problem didn’t seem to have been producing enough tanks or replacing loses (combat or otherwise) half the tanks in a Panzer Div were Panthers by 1944 after all. The problem was replacing and training crews.

Challenger

[Getz]

While you are technically correct that "Thinner sloped armour is not necessarily superior to thicker vertical armour", determining whether it was in this case is a math problem not an opinion.

80 mm of armor at 90 degrees is just 80 mm of armor.  50 mm of armor at 45 degrees is closer to 90 mm.

This diagram provides an excellent explanation:

This all assumes that the shell strikes the 80mm armour at a perfect 90 degree angle - in the real world, this will almost never happen.  Games like World of Tanks greatly overplay the importance of angling the tanks against incoming fire, but it was a factor in real world tank combat and the dynamics of a three dimensional battlefield can completely throw out the assumptions behind "optimal" sloped armour schemes.

More pertinently, overmatching the calibre of projectiles with sheer thickness of armour seems to be an important part of the shatter-gap phenomenon.  Whilst this is probably not applicable in the case of armour of the Pz IV, a monolithic slab of vertical 100mm armour will resist penetration by a 76mm shell better than 71mm of armour inclined at 45 degrees.

Of course, what you ideally want is sloped armour that also of overmatches the calibre of the attacking shell.

[Scotty]

This all assumes that the shell strikes the 80mm armour at a perfect 90 degree angle - in the real world, this will almost never happen.  Games like World of Tanks greatly overplay the importance of angling the tanks against incoming fire, but it was a factor in real world tank combat and the dynamics of a three dimensional battlefield can completely throw out the assumptions behind "optimal" sloped armour schemes.

You'll have to forgive me if I don't see how that's pertinent to the conversation - especially since it applies universally to all tanks.  The point of the illustration was to demonstrate how sloped armor materially and significantly increases the effective armor, and to prove that, yes, the Sherman had better armor than a late-model Panzer IV even though the latter had a physically thicker plate.

More pertinently, overmatching the calibre of projectiles with sheer thickness of armour seems to be an important part of the shatter-gap phenomenon.  Whilst this is probably not applicable in the case of armour of the Pz IV, a monolithic slab of vertical 100mm armour will resist penetration by a 76mm shell better than 71mm of armour inclined at 45 degrees.

Do you happen to have any experimental data to go with that assertion?  I don't doubt that the shatter-gap is a significant consideration, but in the instance of this particular comparison I'm interested in seeing the data on it.

[Garrand]

One important point about the sloped armor issue: just about every modern tank uses sloped armor to advantage, with only a few exceptions. Not only does sloped armor increase protection & increase the chances of a deflection, but also can be made lighter for a given level of protection (since the plate can be forged thinner). While the point about shells not always coming in at a 90deg angle is valid enough, most tank combat traditionally happened at ranges where the trajectoiry if an AP shell was very flat, & did not require much elevation to compensate for range (although a modern example, IIRC the APDS shell of the modern 120mm is essentially flat out to 900m). Finally, if sloped armor was not advantageous, then why did the German army adopt is so enthusiastically in tanks like the Panther & the Tiger II (just to name two)? If flat plate armor was so advantageous, why was it abandoned for sloped armor anyway?

Damon.

[VhenRa]

In reality the Panzer IV with the long 75 was perfectly good for dealing with ANY allied Tank until something like the Comet or IS-1 came along.  Building more of them and working on that chassis would have been more workable than the Zoo.

The Panther, Tiger and Tiger II were magnificent machines, and the Panther along with the T-34 helped set the development of modern AFVs, but what the Germans needed was easier, quicker to produce and cheaper machines, and they had that with the Panzer IV.

Eh, the Panther was in fact cheaper and faster to produce then a Panzer IV. The benefits of being built on a production line instead of by hand. Now if they had applied that production line technique to something less complicated... it would have been even cheaper and faster to build.

[Nightlord01]

Eh, the Panther was in fact cheaper and faster to produce then a Panzer IV. The benefits of being built on a production line instead of by hand. Now if they had applied that production line technique to something less complicated... it would have been even cheaper and faster to build.

While I'm no tank expert, I know a bit about mass production. It's messy, wasteful and suffers a much lower reliability, while still suffering a lot of the drawbacks of being hand made. Noting that Germany during WW II was suffering serious shortages in just about every material required for making tanks, production lines may have left them with even less, just delivered faster!

[VhenRa]

While I'm no tank expert, I know a bit about mass production. It's messy, wasteful and suffers a much lower reliability, while still suffering a lot of the drawbacks of being hand made. Noting that Germany during WW II was suffering serious shortages in just about every material required for making tanks, production lines may have left them with even less, just delivered faster!

Yeah, the Panther used significantly more metal for it's tonnage IIRC. On the other hand... it required nowhere near as much skilled labor to produce and the parts were significantly more standardised. The Panzer IV required basically artisans to produce it, extremely skilled craftsman. A Panther could be made by any half-educated idiot because each person only handled one part of the production line IIRC.

[Cannonshop]

To whit the Panther could do 28mph at a time when most medium tanks could only do 24 to 26mph...

Damon.

yah, but it couldn't do it for very long (or very far) without breaking down.

[Istal_Devalis]

On another note, people tend to ignore how well the Sherman did in North Africa in British service.

https://imgur.com/a/k0FzQ
Note the British considered it a Cruiser tank, not an Infantry tank.
For a bit of fun, scroll down to the bit about why the Germans revealed the Tiger so early

Making the other tanks and the standard Sherman de facto infantry support tanks.

No..they really really werent. Shermans were designed, planned, and expected to make killing other tanks a primary duty.

Some stuff I found after digging.
FM-17 Employment of Armored Units - Armored Division
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/PDFs/FM17.pdf
"23. ATTACK FROM MARCH COLUMN
b. AGAINST ARMORED UNITS.--(1)
When enemy armored units are met during a march, attack will be made from march column. The tank units lead the attack. Missions and objectives for subordinate units will be immediately ordered by the division and column commanders. The tank destroyer units well forward in the column may be used to attack and delay the enemy
  (2) Once an enemy armored force is in position to intervene in the battle, its destruction is the main task of our own armored units. The enemy armored units must be attacked and destroyed by all available anti-tank weapons, and by the tank destroyer battalion, even if this entails the abandoning of a previously assigned mission."

And from FM17-10 Tactics and Techniques (1942)
"Ch2 Tactical Employment, Sec 5 The Defensive, 52. GENERAL.-a. Role.-The primary role of armored forces on the defensive is the tactical offensive. Their usual employment will be in the counterattack.
...
Ch2, Sec 5, 64. Tank Versus Tank Combat
5) Medium tank units, owing to their superior armor and armament, are used to lead attacks against hostile mechanized units. They are supported by tank destroyer units"

[Matti]

Did you know, vikings did not have horns on their helmets. And ninja weren't assassins but spies. And wolves don't howl at the moon, they just howl regardless of is moon in the sky or not. In similar manner Sherman (and number of other tanks) seem to have some misconceptions going around.

[Getz]

Do you happen to have any experimental data to go with that assertion?  I don't doubt that the shatter-gap is a significant consideration, but in the instance of this particular comparison I'm interested in seeing the data on it.

I'm afraid I'm not nearly expert enough to do more than repeat stuff I've read on other forums in the past.  Those guys seemed to know what they were talking about, however...

Finally, if sloped armor was not advantageous, then why did the German army adopt is so enthusiastically in tanks like the Panther & the Tiger II (just to name two)? If flat plate armor was so advantageous, why was it abandoned for sloped armor anyway?

You're misunderstanding.  Sloped armour is advantageous - 100mm of sloped armour is much better than 100mm vertical armour.  However, a thinner sheet of sloped armour will not necessarily outperform a thicker slab of vertical armour depending on whether the armour over matches the calibre of the projectile or not.  There's also the matter of the relative hardness of the armour - it's a pretty complicated topic...

[VhenRa]

Did you know, vikings did not have horns on their helmets. And ninja weren't assassins but spies. And wolves don't howl at the moon, they just howl regardless of is moon in the sky or not. In similar manner Sherman (and number of other tanks) seem to have some misconceptions going around.

A pile of the Sherman misconceptions come from the writings of Belton Y. Cooper's autobiography, entitled Death Traps. The issue is... he is writing it from the perspective of himself, a tank mechanic in a high-level maintenance/recovery unit and most of the time when he saw a Sherman, he was dragging it back to the repair depot because it was crippled. He very rarely saw a Sherman in working order and thus in a startling cause of "Correlation does not imply causation" he inferred it because the Shermans were a death trap.

[Garrand]

A pile of the Sherman misconceptions come from the writings of Belton Y. Cooper's autobiography, entitled Death Traps. The issue is... he is writing it from the perspective of himself, a tank mechanic in a high-level maintenance/recovery unit and most of the time when he saw a Sherman, he was dragging it back to the repair depot because it was crippled. He very rarely saw a Sherman in working order and thus in a startling cause of "Correlation does not imply causation" he inferred it because the Shermans were a death trap.

IIRC Cooper was actually an ordinance officer, & specifically one of the jobs of his unit was to hose out knocked out tanks. So it is little wonder why he would have a negative perspective on the Sherman.

Damon.

[Kidd]

The truth probably lies somewhere between such immediate first reactions and decades-later historical revisionism.

The Sherman was probably neither a tommy-cooker nor medium tank Wonderbread; the Tiger was probably neither a rolling lemon on tracks nor an invincible steel bogeyman.

[VhenRa]

Eh, the Tiger wasn't too bad. It had better serviceability ratings then the Panzer IV in Normandy in 44. That is to say, more Tigers were operational as a percentage than Panzer IVs. Not a big surprise, considering it had enough development time, IIRC it was already in development when war were declared.

The Tiger II and Panther on other hand... 

[DoctorMonkey]

at the risk of re-igniting this and sorry for a long post...


I do not claim any military experience and my background is medical rather than anything else (although we are trained to assess data and evidence and I have a significant interest in history and military history).


My understanding is that the advantages the Sherman had over the Panther and Tiger were:
- crew survival in the event of being taken out: my understanding is that overall/in North West Europe something like 80% of tank crews could bail out of a knocked out tank to crew another tank; a T-35 had something like a 20% survival rate; the data on knocked out tanks came from the doctrine across all sides in WW2 of shooting a tank until it is definitely dead and that generally means on fire whether or not the crew have bailed out; I don't know how survivable the German tanks were but one combat records that of 3 Tigers destroyed by IS-2 tanks only two crew members survived.
- logistics: these tanks could be mass produced, easily shipped from the USA to the combat theatres and by standardising on essentially a single design spare parts were easier to supply (as opposed to a German unit that might have some Panzer IVs, Panzer II command tanks, Panthers, Tigers and some StUGs).
- reliability: this means that when you send a battalion to an attack about a battalion's worth of tanks arrive at the start line, for the Germans perhaps half the battalion of Panthers would make it without breaking down (and they could only move at night and often lacked fuel).


I think that all three of the above points work with the adage that amateurs study tactics but professionals study logistics as all three points are logistical benefits to the Sherman over the Panther and the Tiger.


The description I have read that is best is that the Sherman was good enough to win with a gun that was good enough for some anti-tank work and firing HE rounds at the time it was developed (look at the poor M-3 Grant/Lee with two main guns...); with enough Shermans you cold throw enough at a small German unit to get the flank hits that would knock out the tanks and the losses of trained personnel were acceptable even if you lost the tanks back to repair or salvage. A description of an action in North Africa is that a Tiger is merrily brewing up Sherman tanks so a (or at least one) 17 pounder anti-tank gun was brought into range and started firing at the Tiger, the Tiger then turned it's frontal armour to the 17 pounder meaning it was exposing flank armour to the Shermans and thus although not penetrated or knocked out it withdrew: this is a victory because the New Zealander force achieved their goal. The Germans also talked about the danger of the Sherman tank in "herds".


The other thing at least some Allied users of the Sherman had (I know the British and Canadian Armies had these but not sure about the Americans) was artillery forward observer tanks which allowed them to call in artillery strikes rapidly on the enemy positions.


I've recently been to the Tank Museum at Bovington and they have some Tigers and at least one Panther as well as Shermans and the size difference is significant meaning the German tanks will be easier to spot as they are taller and can't hide behind the same cover.


At the Tank Museum I bought a book called The Tank Commander Pocket Manual 1939-1945 that is mostly extracts from the various doctrines about tank use - for example the US Army 1942 Field Manual says medium tanks "are used to (1) lead an attack against an enemy whose position and strength are known (2) support by fire the attack of either light or medium tanks" while under mission and echelons of attack it says "the mission of tanks in the armored division is to attack and destroy vital hostile installations such as command posts, supply installations, reserves, and artillery" (I hope you all appreciate that in making a direct quote I misspelled armour for you and inserted an Oxford comma which I don't believe in). Later the same field manual talks about what ammunition to use against different targets and in all cases the armour piercing is for use against hostile tanks whether 37mm or 75mm.


Even a British Army pamphlet from 1939 says that for counter-attacks the infantry tanks of the army tank battalions are eminently suitable for use against enemy AFVs and they then go on to give detailed advice about tank-versus-tank combat.


Finally there is a quoted passage from the commander of the first unit of Tiger 1s in action in Russia - one tank's transmission died getting onto the train to Russia but it was taken on the train with them, then two more were out of action with transmission trouble on the first day in Russia... which left one tank to actually go out and patrol! When the Tigers did make it into action three of the four were damaged with one write-off but the crews commented on all being able to evacuate and feeling safe in them. So, a good weapon if it makes it to the fight.

[VhenRa]

- crew survival in the event of being taken out: my understanding is that overall/in North West Europe something like 80% of tank crews could bail out of a knocked out tank to crew another tank; a T-35 had something like a 20% survival rate; the data on knocked out tanks came from the doctrine across all sides in WW2 of shooting a tank until it is definitely dead and that generally means on fire whether or not the crew have bailed out; I don't know how survivable the German tanks were but one combat records that of 3 Tigers destroyed by IS-2 tanks only two crew members survived.

Interestingly, the crew survival rates for British Shermans were lower then American Shermans, you want to know why?

British tankers wore berets, Americans wore helmets. Want to take a guess what the added deaths and injuries were for the British? Head wounds.

But yes, the main difference in crew escape for the Sherman was that the hatches were spring loaded. You pull the "GET OUT OF HERE" lever and the hatch would immediately bolt open... and there was more hatches and they were aligned with the seats and there was a lot of room for the crew. With some German, British and USSR tanks you almost had to crawl into the tank from on top of it.

Sherman ratio was something like 1 Death (Or was it 1 injury, not even death? I can't remember) per knocked out tank. Meaning if you knocked out all the tanks in a company (18 Shermans) and issued the survivors new tanks to operate.. you would be able to reconstitute 14 tanks just on surviving manpower. You do the same with the German tanks and you might be lucky to field 4 IIRC.

I've recently been to the Tank Museum at Bovington and they have some Tigers and at least one Panther as well as Shermans and the size difference is significant meaning the German tanks will be easier to spot as they are taller and can't hide behind the same cover.

Sherman would be even more low profile if it had the transmission at the rear and it didn't have to run the drive shaft through the tank itself. The T20 series of prototype tanks basically started from "Sherman, but put the transmission in the back so we can lower the tank.

[MoneyLovinOgre4Hire]

Weren't Sherman hatches larger than most other tank hatches at the time, making it easier to get into, and more importantly get out of the tank in a hurry?

[VhenRa]

Weren't Sherman hatches larger than most other tank hatches at the time, making it easier to get into, and more importantly get out of the tank in a hurry?

Yup. And lined up properly over the seats so you didn't have to crawl/jiggle around in the tank AND had spring loading...

[The Eagle]

Something that the Chieftain mentioned in a video I watched recently that stuck with me was his comment that the Sherman wasn't the best tank, but it was the best tank for the USA.  Ease of manufacture, ease of transport, reliability, ease of repair and recovery, good enough armor and firepower, and most importantly: it could operate everywhere.  It had zero issues operating in Europe or Africa or the Far East or the Karellian isthmus.  It fought in forests, deserts, jungles, beaches, and tundra successfully.

[Kidd]

I was waiting for the whole series of posts to be out, but well... the usual rules warnings etc for Reddit apply

The amount of work and research done here is amazing. Do at least skim through this chap's posts.

https://www.reddit.com/r/TankPorn/comments/7z66z2/the_tiger_i_and_the_51_myth_an_analysis_of_combat/

https://www.reddit.com/r/TankPorn/comments/7zfaku/part_2_the_tiger_i_and_the_51_myth_an_analysis_of/

https://www.reddit.com/r/TankPorn/comments/7zx9lo/tiger_51_myth_part_3/

https://www.reddit.com/r/TankPorn/comments/80ntxb/tiger_51_myth_part_4_the_death_of_wittmann_and/

https://www.reddit.com/r/TankPorn/comments/80wl5o/tiger_51_myth_part_5_operatrion_tractable_going/

[Nightlord01]

I think that all three of the above points work with the adage that amateurs study tactics but professionals study logistics as all three points are logistical benefits to the Sherman over the Panther and the Tiger.

Interesting adage, wrong as all hell, but interesting none the less.

[ANS Kamas P81]

Yup. And lined up properly over the seats so you didn't have to crawl/jiggle around in the tank AND had spring loading...

Nick Moran's "Oh My God The Tank Is On Fire" test is really interesting.  Sometimes I wonder how those belly hatches were to be used as anything more than a place to take a leak, from as small as some of those were.

[VhenRa]

Nick Moran's "Oh My God The Tank Is On Fire" test is really interesting.  Sometimes I wonder how those belly hatches were to be used as anything more than a place to take a leak, from as small as some of those were.

Yeah, his videos on various tanks are quite enlightening aren't they? Especially on how easy they are to get in and out of.

[Istal_Devalis]

Not just the hatches. The US put a thought a lot of thought into stopping ammo fires, and crew ergonomics. I mean, the Sherman wasn't a comfortable ride, but compared to certain others? Luxury. Soviet Sherman crews would post guards to keep the infantry from stealing the seat leather.